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WASHINGTON CASE LAW
as to what "inheres" in Washington verdicts. Hence, all effects are to
be excluded, as are those facts which are "linked to the juror's motive,
intent or belief."
The nebulousness of the Washington test, and indeed, of the whole
logical quagmire of "effects" and "inherent facts," is but symptomatic
of a second and more fundamental problem: What is the real basis of
the "inherent fact" concept? While a fact-effect distinction has some
basis in reason, to speak of facts which do and do not "inhere" has no
logical significance, save as a conclusion. It is.pure sophistry to say
that such statements by a juror as,53 We don't want D to lose his ranch
or I know D is guilty because he is a member of that gang, are any less
"linked to the juror's motive, intent, or belief" than I rode horses for
years and that accident was the rider's fault or I will not read the
court's instructions, because the law is ... or plaintiff's damages are
$2000 plus $2000, which equals $5000. Whether each statement was or
was not made is a fact. The "linking" test prescribed by the court can-
not separate these facts into two distinct categories--"inhering" and
"non-inhering"--nor can any other verbal shorthand. At best, such
tests may aid in classifying the results and predicting future decisions.
The real question for the court in each case is whether this is the sort of
fact which should be allowed to impeach the verdict. This is simply a
policy decision. The Washington court has tried to formulate a work-
able rule in light of the conflicting interests of stability and justice in
the individual case. Absent meaningful data showing how juries actu-
ally reach verdicts and the effect on this process of allowing impeach-
ment-and looking to what the cases decide, not what they say-one
cannot say that the Washington court has not developed a salutary and
workable compromise. RicHARD E. KEEF.
TORTS
Assumption of the Risk. In Siragusa v. Swedish Hospital' the
Washington Supreme Court abolished the assumption of risk defense in
suits brought by employees against their employers. Overruling prior
decisions that were inconsistent, the court held that an employer has a
duty to exercise reasonable care to provide his employees with a rea-
53These statements are paraphrases of the affidavits in various Washington cases
rather than quotes, since in many of the cases the exact language of the affidavits has
not been set out.
1160 Wash. Dec. 314, 373 P.2d 767 (1962).
1963]
VASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
sonably safe place to work, and may not assert as a defense to an action
based on his breach of that duty, that the injured employee was aware
or should have known of the negligently maintained condition. The
court adopted the position of the Missouri and North Carolina courts
that the employee never assumes the risks arising from the employer's
negligence, but only those which remain after the master has exercised
ordinary care.'
The action was brought by Maria Siragusa, a nurse's aide, for per-
sonal injuries she received while attending patients in a six-bed ward.
As was customary practice, she had closed the door to the ward.
Mounted on the inside of the door was a metal hook which enabled
personnel to open it with a forearm. At the time of the accident the
plaintiff was using a washbasin located directly behind the door and
within its inward swing. A patient in a wheelchair entered the room,
pushing the door inward and causing the metal hook to strike the
plaintiff in the upper portion of her back. The plaintiff's theory was
that her employer had been negligent for failing to provide her with
a reasonably safe place to work. The defendant hospital interposed
the usual triad of defenses' used in cases of this nature, viz., no negli-
gence, contributory negligence, and assumption of the risk. The trial
court dismissed the action, ruling as a matter of law that the plaintiff
assumed the risk of harm.'
Though recognizing this ruling to be consistent with prior Washing-
ton decisions, and though no argument had been made regarding the
efficacy of the doctrine (the plaintiff had predicated the trial court's
error solely on its refusal to submit the issue of her assumption of the
risk to the jury)5 the court went directly to the merits and declared both
2 111 support of its decision the court cited these cases: Hines v. Continental Baking
Co., 334 S.W.2d 140 (Mo. 1960); Markley v. Kansas City So. Ry., 338 Mo. 436,
90 S.W.2d 409 (1936); George v. St. L. & S.F. Ry., 225 Mo. 364, 125 S.W. 196(1910) ; Devlin v. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry., 87 Mo. 545 (1885); West v. Fontana
Mining Corp., 198 N.C. 150, 150 S.E. 884 (1929); Maulden v. High Point Bending
& Chair Co., 196 N.C. 122, 144 S.E. 557 (1928) ; Yarborough v. F. C. Geer Co., 171
N.C. 334, 88 S.E. 474 (1916) ; Leggett v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 152 N.C. 110, 67
S.E. 249 (1910) ; Bennett v. Carolina Mfg. Co., 147 N.C. 620, 61 S.E. 463 (1908);
Sibbert v. Scotland Cotton Mills, 145 N.C. 308, 59 S.E. 79 (1907).
3 See, e.g., Richter v. Razore, 56 Wn.2d 580, 354 P.2d 706 (1960) ; Jobe v. Spo-
kane Gas & Fuel Co., 73 Wash. 1, 131 Pac. 235 (1913). See generally PROSSER,
TORTS §§ 67-68 (2d ed. 1955).
4 The ruling apparently meant that even if, on the facts, the hospital had been
negligent, the plaintiff was barred from recovery because she knew or should have
known of the condition and danger created thereby. By remaining in the employment
she "assumed the risk" of injury.
5 The plaintiff's knowledge and appreciation, actual or imputed, of the risk are
factual issues often best left to the jury. Blanco v. Sun Ranches, Inc., 38 Wn.2d
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the doctrinal concept and term inappropriate. The court remanded,
directing that the injured nurse's aide recover for her injury if the jury
finds that it resulted from her employer's failure to use reasonable care
to provide a safe place to work,' unless the plaintiff be found to have
unreasonably exposed herself to the danger.' The plaintiff's knowledge
and appreciation of the risk of injury from the door swinging against
her now has relevance only in determining if the hospital was negligent
toward her, or if she was contributorily negligent.
The doctrine of assumption of the risk is a particular use of the
maxim volenti non fit injurias Concise definition is rendered impossible
by the varied senses in which courts have used the doctrine.' It has
been said that it is a defense which arises out of the contract" of
employment and which precludes the employee's right to recover in
all cases in which he knew and appreciated the risk which caused his
injury. 1 In Washington an exception to this rule was made in cases
where the employee had been induced to remain at work by his em-
ployer's promise to remedy the defect, and was injured before he knew
that the promise had not been kept or before a reasonable time had
elapsed. 2
894, 234 P.2d 499 (1951), applies a subjective test. See generally, PROSSER, TORTS
§ 55 (2d ed. 1955) and, with specific reference to cases of master and servant,
id. § 68.
6Siragusa does not make the employer an insurer of his employee's safety. The
employer's liability is based on his negligence, his failure to use reasonable care under
the circumstances to provide his employee with a reasonably safe place to work.
7 An employee's recovery will be barred by his "contributory negligence" if his
conduct in encountering the danger or failure to exercise care for his self-protection
was unreasonable under the circumstances. This is to be distinguished from "assump-
tion of risk" where an employee's conduct may have been entirely reasonable and
still his recovery could, under prior cases, have been barred. See Walsh v. West
Coast Coal Mines, Inc., 31 Wn2d 396, 197 P.2d 233 (1948) ; PRossER, TORTS § 55,
at 394 (2d ed. 1955).
8 "He who consents cannot receive an injury." BLACK, LAW DICTioNARY 1746 (4th
ed. 1951). Walsh v. West Coast Coal Mines, Inc., 31 Wn.2d 396, 197 P.2d 233
,(1948), a case dealing with landowner and invitee, states that only the doctrine of
assumption of risk" applies to cases of master and servant. The maxim volenti nonfit injuria is appropriate to other situations. This is called a "distinction without a
difference" and a minority idea in PRoSSR, TORTS § 55 n.86 (2d ed. 1955). In this
regard it is interesting to note that the Walsh rule relating to "assumption of risk"
was cited as controlling in Focht v. Johnson, 51 Wn2d 47, 315 P.2d 633 (1957), a
case involving landlord and tenant.
9 See 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 21.1 (1956) ; PROSSER, TORTS § 55 (2d ed. 1955).
10 See Myers v. Little Church, 37 Wn.2d 897, 227 P.2d 165 (1951); 3 LABATT,
MAsTER AND SERVANT § 1163 (2d ed. 1913). But see PROSSER, TORTS § 55 (2d ed.
1955) where the doctrine is considered a creature of tort law, a later development in
the law of negligence.31 PROSsER, TORTS § 68 (2d ed. 1955) ; 3 LABAr, op. Cit. supra note 10, § 1165.
12 See, e.g., Johnson v. North Coast Stevedoring Co., 109 Wash. 236, 186 Pac. 663
(1920) ; Murphy v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 68 Wash. 643, 124 Pac. 114 (1912). Cf.,
Focht v. Johnson, 51 Wn.2d 47, 315 P.2d 633 (1957); Ebding v. Foster, 34 Wn.2d
539, 209 P2d 367 (1949).
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An English case, Priestley v. Fowler," gave the doctrine its real
impetus. The socio-economic climate which spurred its acceptance
was oriented completely toward the employer of capital." Even so,
early courts apparently felt that the employer should exercise some
care for the protection of his servants, since opinions were phrased in
terms of the master's owing a duty of reasonable care. However, the
expanding industrial society provided an economic counter-balance to
the social desirability of enforcing such a duty. 5 Most courts 6 adopted
the doctrinal blindfold of "assumption of risk" to justify what, viewed
in historical context, seemed a practically sound result.
With the establishment of industry came a slow movement toward
social reform. The protective attitude with which today's society
regards the workman originated in the early 1900's. Industrial profits
increased to the extent that workplant safeguards were considered
practical. It was generally accepted that industry (the employer)
should bear the burden of reasonably protecting against hazardous
conditions in the plant or paying for its neglect. Insuring against the
cost burdens of injury became accepted and expected. The employer
could absorb the expense in the price of his product. Passage of work-
men's compensation legislation expressed this shift in opinion.' Even
with the advent of such legislation, courts adhered to the assumption
doctrine, holding the employee to assume the risk of industrial injury.
Early expression of dissatisfaction with the rule can be found in
Washington case law. The rather isolated case of Hull v. Davenport8
expressly limited the application of the doctrine it considered "harsh
at best" to situations where the plaintiff was necessarily contributorily
negligent. In another early case 9 the court equivocally espoused the
rule later adopted in Siragusa, that a servant "assumes those dangers
only which are inherent in and which exist from the nature of business,
33 M.&W. 1, 19 ENG. RUL. CAS. 102 (1837), a case of master and servant cited
in 3 LABATT, op. cit. supra note 9 § 893 n.5 (2d ed. 1913) ; PROSSER, TORTS § 55 n.80
(2d ed. 1955).
1435 Am. Jur. Master & Servant § 294 (1941).
15 Black, J., summarizes the history in Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 318 U.S.
54 (1943).
16 The exceptions, Missouri and North Carolina, refused to hold that the servant
assumed the risk of his master's negligence. 56 C.J.S. Master & Servant § 362
nn.64 & 67 (1948).
1T Unlike the principal case where liability is based on the employer's negligence,
vorkmen's compensation is a form of strict liability. However, the theory embodied
in the legislation and which probably influenced the Court in Siragusa is that indus-
trial losses are costs of production and "the cost of the product should bear the
blood of the workmen." PROSSER, TORTS § 69 at 382 (2d ed. 1955).
1893 Wash. 16, 159 Pac. 1072 (1916).
19 Howland v. Standard Milling & Logging Co., 50 Wash. 34, 96 Pac. 686 (1908).
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those dangers against which there is no absolute protection, not those
caused by some negligent act of the master ..... 20 This case was cited
and followed by two others." It was not clear in any of these cases
that the plaintiff knew or appreciated the danger; the same result
could have been reached without these words; and subsequent opinions
apparently overlooked or ignored them."2
The recent and conventional statement of the rule regarding the
employer's duty and defense is found in Focht v. Johnson:"2
While it is the legal duty of an employer to furnish his employees a
reasonably safe place to work, it is also the rule that one who, as
servant or employee, enters into the service of another, assumes by
his contract of employment the risk of all dangers ordinarily incident
to the work upon which he engages ... and also the extraordinary risks
of employment if they are open and apparent, although due directly to
the master's negligence.24
Two recent cases2s were decided under the principle of Focht. They
are of significance in appreciating the new position of the court re-
garding the employer's responsibility toward his employees. Typical
of Washington's prior holdings is the case of Richter v. Razore,6
decided in 1960. In Richter, a long-time bowling alley worker was
injured when he caught his fingers in the unguarded gears of a pin-
setting machine. The plaintiff was aware that no guard was on the
machine and appreciated the danger thereby created. He alleged that
his employer had been negligent in not placing a guard on the machine
to protect people working around it. (The manufacturer did make such
a guard available.) The court in a unanimous opinion held, "It is our
conclusion that, although the condition of the pinsetting machine
constituted an extraordinary risk created by the negligence of respond-
ent employers ... appellant assumed the risk, and is thus precluded
from recovering for the injury he sustained."2
20 Id. at 38, 96 Pac. 686, 687-88 (1908).21 Blair v. City of Spokane, 66 Wash. 399, 119 Pac. 839 (1911) ; Arneson v. Grant
Smith & Co., 120 Wash. 98, 206 Pac. 960 (1922).22 E.g., Imbler v. Spokane, P. & S. Ry., 164 Wash. 299, 2 P.2d 895 (1931), cited
the cases to support the proposition that the danger must be obvious or known by
the plaintiff before he will be held to have assumed the risk of injury. In Jobe v.
Spokane Gas & Fuel Co., 73 Wash. 1, 131 Pac. 235 (1913), the language was
acknowledged but otherwise essentially ignored.
2351 Wn,2d 47, 315 P.2d 633 (1957).
24The quotation is derived from two cases, Walsh v. West Coast Coal Mines, Inc.,
31 Wn2d 396, 406, 197 P.2d 233, 238 (1948), and Cummins v. Dufault, 18 Wn.2d
274, 280-82, 139 P.2d 308, 311-12 (1943).
25 Richter v. Razore, 56 Wn.2d 580, 354 P2d 706 (1960) ; Walsh v. Richey-Gilbert
Co., 55 Wn.2d 190, 346 P.2d 1010 (1959).
26 56 Vn,2d 580, 354 P.2d 706 (1960).
2
7Id. at 583, 354 P.2d 706, 708-09 (1960).
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The result reached in Richter or in any other given case might well
remain unchanged under the Siragusa rule. It is probable that the
court has used the doctrine in many cases to bar a plaintiff's recovery
when other concepts could more appropriately have been used. In
several cases it appears that the employer owed his employee "no
duty"28 as to the particular danger. In others it seemed, under the
circumstances, that a "reasonably safe place to work ' ' had been
provided. And in many cases the plaintiff's "contributory negligence"3
was apparent. However, from a more literal reading of the cases it
appears that the court limited the employer's responsibility to warning
the employee of hidden dangers or to making the premises as safe as
they appeared to be.
It was not until 1962 and Siragusa that the Washington court clearly
gave decisional recognition and judicial acceptance to changed policy.
The cases proved that a warning often served neither as adequate
protection nor as an inducement to the employee to leave his position.
And, in view of the number of benefits society confers upon workmen
who are injured, such as public welfare, aid to dependent children and
rehabilitation programs, it was expectable that the Washington court
require employers to do more to guard against such injuries. Holding
that the exculpating assumption of risk doctrine was outdated, the
court abandoned it. Now the Washington employer must use reason-
able care to provide a reasonably safe place to work or else pay for his
neglect.3  Washington leads most3 2 jurisdictions in giving judicial
recognition to socio-economic developments in employer-employee re-
lationships.
28 E.g., Cotton v. Morck Hotel Co., 32 Wn.2d 326, 201 P.2d 711 (1949) ; Dahl v.
Puget Sound Iron & Steel Works, 77 Wash. 126, 137 Pac. 315 (1913); Week v.
Fremont Mill Co., 3 Wash. 629, 29 Pac. 215 (1892). In the above cases the employer
reasonably may not have known of the particular danger. See also Walsh v. Richey-
Gilbert Co., 55 Wn.2d 190, 346 P.2d 1010 (1959), where the danger may have been
due to natural orchard conditions or the employee may have expressly relieved the
employer from any liability for possible injury.
29 E.g., Walsh v. Richey-Gilbert Co., 55 Wn.2d 190, 346 P.2d 1010 (1959) ; Eiban
v. Widsteen, 31 Wn.2d 655, 198 P.2d 667 (1948) ; De Haas v. Cascade Frozen Foods,
Inc., 23 Wn.2d 754, 162 P.2d 284 (1945) ; Stanke v. Spokane, C. D'Alene & P. Ry.,
181 Wash. 472, 43 P.2d 961 (1935); Griffith v. Washington Water Power Co., 102
Wash. 78, 172 Pac. 822, aff'd on rehearing, 104 Wash. 694, 176 Pac. 343 (1918);
Lewis v. Simpson, 3 Wash. 641, 29 Pac. 207 (1892).
30 E.g., Richter v. Razore, 56 Wn.2d 580, 354 P.2d 706 (1960) ; Ebding v. Foster,
34 Wn.2d 539, 209 P.2d 367 (1949) ; Scheiber v. Grigsby, 28 Wn.2d 322, 182 P.2d
745 (1947); De Haas v. Cascade Frozen Foods, Inc., 23 Wn.2d 754, 162 P.2d 284
(1945) ; Cummins v. Dufault, 18 Wn.2d 274, 139 P.2d 308 (1943) ; Brandon v. Globe
Inv. Co., 108 Wash. 360, 184 Pac. 325 (1919); Lewis v. Simpson, 3 Wash. 641, 29
Pac. 207 (1892).
31 Siragusa v. Swedish Hospital, 160 Wash. Dec. 314, 373 P.2d 767 (1962). It is
as if the court had said, "And this time we mean it!"
32 With the exceptions of Missouri and North Carolina. See note 16, supra.
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Equally as significant as Washington's abandonment of the concept
embodied in "assumption of risk," is its rejection of the doctrinal
terminology. Judge Hunter's was not an easy task since the phrase has
enjoyed a long history. He began by recognizing that to make em-
ployees assume the risks of danger "ordinarily incident" to their
employment really means that "the master is under no duty to protect
the servant with regard to such risks and any injuries, therefore, are
not due to the master's negligence." 8 Further, Judge Hunter noted
that the present operation of the doctrine "is to reduce substantially
or strictly limit the asserted duty of care owed by the employer to his
employees." 4 The employer is "only under a duty to give warning of
the dangerous condition." 5 The holding in Siragusa was therefore
phrased not in terms of "assumption of risk" but exclusively in terms
of the employer's "duty." 6
The logical analysis employed by the court in Siragusa is one gener-
ally favored by leading text writers." Professor James argues that the
term "assumption of risk" as used is "purely duplicative of other more
widely understood concepts, such as scope of duty or contributory
negligence."38 Another writer 9 asserts that it was purely an "accident
of litigation" which caused the courts to consider cases in terms of
the servant's assumption of the risk rather than the master's duty to
protect the servant against those risks.
As before noted, it is a very real possibility that prior Washington
decisions used "assumption of the risk" as a handy phrase to justify
barring the plaintiff's recovery when he would have been precluded
from recovery for another more conceptually accurate reason. But the
opinions which merely substitute the phrase for analysis in terms of
duty or contributory negligence do not justify the use of the doctrinal
language. Rather they illustrate the confusion and redundancy which
the assumption doctrine permits and lend support to its banishment
from case discussion.
Precise analysis requires decision of personal injury actions in
33 Siragusa v. Swedish Hospital, 160 Wash. Dec. 314, 321, 373 P2d 767, 772 (1962).34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.30Id. at 322, 373 P.2d 767, 772-73 (1962).
37 See generally, 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 21.8 (1956) ; 3 LABATr, MASTER
AND SERVANT § 893 (2d ed. 1913). Cf., PROSSER, TORTS § 55 (2d ed. 1955), which
states that the defense might have some merit in focusing attention on the element
of consent or voluntary acceptance of a known risk.
382 HARPER & JAmEs, TORTS § 21.8 at 1191 (1956). This is essentially a reprint
of James, Assumption of Risk, 61 YALE L.J. 141 (1952).
39 3 LtaATr, op. cit., supra note 37 § 893.
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terms of the defendant's duty toward the person injured, with the
plaintiff's contributory negligence as the only affirmative defense.
Earlier courts might well have said, when in fact they did hold, that
the employer need only warn his employee of dangers that the em-
ployee could not be expected to recognize. The duty concept is the
essence of a negligence action.4 ° Before one can be held negligent he
must have failed in a duty owed to another. As used in tort law,
"duty" is primarily the court's way of implementing social ideas about
who is best able to bear the costs of the injury or the reasonable elim-
ination of its cause.4 A realistic adjustment of the duty to be imposed
on any given class of potential defendants (such as employers, land-
owners, or gratuitous lenders) is possible. It involves a recognition
and weighing of policy considerations which vary with the defendant.
Fair appraisal will make it clear whether a given standard of care is
justifiable. In each case, a typical variants will influence the determin-
ation of whether the particular defendant indeed fulfilled his duty of
care. Such analysis will produce understandable decisions as well as
individual justice. It is to be appreciated that today's court, in
Siragusa, did not indulge in any fiction, but simply determined the
duty to be imposed on an employer and remanded the case for the jury
to find whether the employer had fulfilled that duty.
A possible source of confusion regarding the court's analytical ap-
proach was introduced by the majority's quotation from Missouri
opinions and reinforced by Judge Ott's concurring opinion regarding
proper jury instructions. The Missouri language, favored by Judge
Ott, is that "a servant never assumes risks arising from negligence for
which the master is liable, but only those which remain after the master
has exercised ordinary care."42 Missouri courts uniformly repeat this
language. However, mere repetition does not produce conceptual
accuracy. Precise analysis can be preserved by remembering that the
court adopted the position of the Missouri court, not its terminology."
The Siragusa opinion did not set out new limits for the doctrine of
assumption of the risk; in effect it abolished it as a defense in suits
40 See generally PROSSER, TORTS §§ 35, 36 (2d ed. 1955).
41 Id. § 36.
42 Siragusa v. Swedish Hospital, 160 Wash. 314, 323-24, 373 P.2d 767, 774 (1962).
43 Dictum in Glass v. Carnation Co., 160 Wash. Dec. 346, 373 P.2d 775 (1962)
reiterates the logically inconsistent wording of the Missouri decisions. However, in
a later decision, Judge Finley accurately stated the Siragusa holding when he said,
"[T]his court has eliminated the doctrine of assumption of risk, regarding employer-
employee relationships, from the jurisprudence of this state." Handler v. Osman, 160
Wash. Dec. 803, 806, 376 P.2d 439, 442 (1962).
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brought by employees against their employers. Hopefully the Siragusa
reasoning will precipitate a return to first principles of analysis in more
than just employer-employee cases. Siragusa could well mark the
beginning of clarification of an entire area of tort law, now befuddled
by the maxim volenti non fit injuria.
VIRGINIA A. OLDow
Gross Negligence Under the Guest Statute. The first definitive
interpretation of "gross negligence" within the meaning of the 1957
amendment to the Host-Guest Statute has been given by the Washing-
ton court in the case of Crowley v. Barto.2
In this case the administrator of the estate of the deceased brought
a wrongful death action against the defendant, who had been driving
an automobile in which the deceased was a guest. From a judgment of
dismissal following a verdict in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff
appealed, alleging error in the giving of this instruction on the defini-
tion of "gross negligence":
The term 'gross negligence' as applied to this case means an utter
disregard in the operation of a motor vehicle by the host driver for the
safety of a guest passenger. It is the failure of the host driver to use
slight care for the safety of the guest passenger. (Emphasis added.) 3
In reversing the judgment of dismissal the appellate court took the
position that "utter disregard" meant something more than oversight
or failure to act, but in addition involved "willful or intentional
negligence." The standard of positive disregard is applied only to
cases of "wanton misconduct" and not to cases of "gross negligence,"
and so is inconsistent with the standard set by the Guest Statute.
"Gross negligence" instructions should be phrased only in terms of
"absence of slight care" and not in terms of "utter disregard."
By defining "gross negligence" in this way the court has restored
the rule prevailing in Washington prior to the enactment of the Guest
Statute in 1933," a rule which the statute was presumably passed to
avoid. If one admits that it really was the intention of the legislature
'R.C.W. 46.08.080. As amended the statute makes the host liable to the guest if
"the accident was intentional on the part of the owner or operator, or the result of
said owner's or operator's gross negligence or intoxication." Before the 1957 amend-
ment the host was liable only if the accident was intentional. For a critique of the
amendment by Professor Richards, see Note, 32 W.sH. L. Rzv. 210 (1957).
2 59 Wn.2d 280, 367 P.2d 828 (1962).
3 Crowley v. Barto, 59 Wn.2d 280, 282, 367 P2d 828, 829 (1962).
4 Shea v. Olson, 185 Wash. 143, 53 P2d 615 (1936).
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